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The debate over globalization is lively, often passionate, and has 
sometimes been violent. — Stanley Fischer (2003: 2) 
 
1  Introduction 
How globalization affects inequality is under heated debate (Fischer 2003: 5). Stiglitz 
(1998) and Hurrell and Woods (2000), among others, argue that globalization leads to 
increases in inequality as trade increases differentials in returns to education and skills, 
globalization marginalizes certain groups of people or geographic regions, and opening-
up lags behind development of adequate institutions and governance. This view is 
supported by evidence from China and other transitional economies that are 
experiencing significant increases in inequality after their opening up to the outside 
world (Mazur 2000; Birdsall 1999). In developed countries, rising inequalities are being 
linked to trade growth or international specialization as well (Atkinson 1999). On the 
contrary, Ben-David (1993) and Srinivasan and Bhagwati (1999) conclude that 
globalization helps to reduce inequality. This is also supported by evidence from a 
number of countries where inequality decreased when they opened up their economies 
(Wade 2001). In between these two opposing views, Sala-i-Martin (2002a, 2002b) and 
Lindert and Williamson (2001) find that a significant globalization-inequality 
relationship does not exist.  
A number of factors can explain these mixed findings. First, inequality is measured 
differently, not only by employing alternative indices. While some consider inequality 
among individuals, others focus on inequality between countries. Some explore 
inequality of a country or few countries others discuss inequality of the globe. Second, 
there exist differences in the analytical techniques. Most studies use cross-country 
regressions. Some rely on partial correlations between inequality and globalization 
defined in various ways.1 Correlation analysis cannot control for other causal variables 
and cross-country regressions may produce different results when different control 
variables or different model specifications are used. Finally, sample coverage (selection 
of countries and time periods) differs from study to study. 
This  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  by  examining  the  impact  of  globalization  on 
regional  income  inequality  in  China.  Focusing  on  China  requires  little  justification, 
especially  given  China’s  importance  in  determining  the  global  inequality  trend.  In 
addition, it can help alleviate the heterogeneity and data comparability problems often 
encountered  in  cross-country  studies  (Atkinson  and  Brandolini  2001;  Srinivasan  and 
Bhagwati 1999). To enhance the robustness of our empirical results, we first characterize 
the  underlying  income  generating  process  by  the  flexible  Box-Cox  model  and  then 
quantify  the  globalization  impact  under  all  conventional  measures  of  inequality.  In 
decomposing total inequality into components associated with relevant determinants, the 
Shapley value framework of Shorrocks (1999) is combined with the estimated income 
                                                 
1 The concept of globalization has many dimensions, ranging from interdependence of economic 
activities in different countries to flows of ideas across national borders. In this paper, we focus on 
economic globalization through exchanges of goods and services, and flows of foreign capital. Flows of 
labour, information, ideology, culture and living styles are not considered as relevant data are unavailable 
or incomplete.   2
generating function. The framework is based on the cooperative game theory and is 
being recently used by Kolenikov and Shorrocks (forthcoming), and Wan (2004). 
To elaborate further, we seek to answer two questions in this paper: how globalization 
and regional income inequality are related in China? And how much does globalization 
contribute to regional inequality in China? The first question has received some 
attention. Kanbur and Zhang (forthcoming) obtain a positive relationship between 
openness (measured by effective tariff rate and the trade/GDP ratio) and interregional 
inequality. Xing and Zhang (forthcoming) find the same using FDI as a measure of 
openness. However, Wei and Wu (2003) conclude with a negative relationship between 
urban-rural disparity and the trade/GDP ratio. With respect to the second question, little 
has been published with the exception of Zhang and Zhang (2003). Zhang and Zhang 
(2003) estimate a labour productivity (GDP/labour ratio) function and decompose 
inequality (measured by the log variance) in labour productivity into a number of 
components, including those associated with openness. However, the log variance 
measure violates the crucial principle of transfers and the GDP/labour ratio does not 
necessarily relate to personal income in China (Lin and Liu 2003). Bourguignon and 
Morrisson (2002) appeal for the use of income rather than GDP data in analyzing 
inequality.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a background 
description of China’s journey to globalization. Income generating functions are 
specified and estimated in Section 3, where inequality decomposition results are also 
discussed. Finally, policy implications are explored in Section 4. 
2  China’s journey to globalization and regional inequality 
As an active participant of the third globalization process, China is fast integrating into 
the world economy at a pace as remarkable as her economic growth. After over 20 years 
of opening up, China has become the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and the fifth largest trader in the world since 2002.  
2.1 Growing  international  trade 
Before 1979, international trade was under the plan of the central government, which 
controlled more than 90 per cent of trade by monopolizing the imports and exports of 
over 3000 kinds of commodities. These commodities can be classified into two 
categories: plan-commanded goods (both value and volume of trade are strictly 
controlled) and plan-guided goods (only the value of trade is controlled). In 1985, the 
number of goods under these categories was cut to about 100 each. By 1991, almost all 
exports were deregulated, with only 15 per cent controlled by specially appointed 
trading companies. Imports have also been deregulated. The proportion of plan-
commanded imports in the total import volume was reduced from 40 per cent in 1985 to 
18.5 per cent in 1991. By 1994, almost all planning on imports and exports were 
abolished with a few exceptions where extremely important goods were traded by 
specially appointed trading companies. 
In pre-reform China, tariff was high and represented the only form of protection. When 
China initiated significant trade reforms in 1992, the rates of tariff were still high, 
averaged at 44.05 per cent. Since 1992, China has cut its tariff rates substantially every   3
year. The average tariff rate fell to 17.1 per cent in 1998 (Yin 1998: 126). On the other 
hand, non-tariff barriers were introduced in the early 1980s. Subsequently, an increasing 
number of goods were placed under licensed trading and quota. In 1992, some 25 per 
cent of imports and 15 per cent of exports were managed under licenses. However, the 
scope of license and quota management has been narrowed down since 1992. By 1997, 
only 384 categories of imports, a mere 5 per cent of the total, were managed under 
quota and licenses (Yin 1998: 129). 
Both exports and imports have experienced remarkable growth. The growth trend was 
maintained even during the Asian financial crisis. In 1978, China ranked 32nd in the 
world in terms of international trade. The ranking improved to 15th in 1989, 10th in 
1997 and 6th in 2001. The ratio of international trade to GDP also rose from 9.85 per 
cent in 1978 to as high as 42.78 per cent in 2001. In 2002, total trade exceeded US$600 
billion, accounting for more than 50 per cent of China’s GDP.2 This places China as the 
5th largest trader in the world. In passing, it is noted that export of manufactured goods 
has accounted for a larger and larger share since the mid-1980s, while the corresponding 
import has declined though at a slow rate. Clearly, China has been industrializing and is 
becoming a major exporter of manufactured goods. 
Increasing foreign capital inflow 
In 1979, three Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were set up in Guangdong for attracting 
FDI.3 However, not until 1984 did FDI start to pour in. In the same year, twenty-four 
additional SEZs were opened. Since that time, more and more SEZs are developed to 
attract FDI and technology transfer, and to enhance exports. The second wave of FDI 
inflow occurred in 1992 when Deng Xiaoping made the well-known tour of South 
China.  
For many years China was the largest recipient of FDI among developing countries, and 
the second largest in the world since 1993, next to the United States. In 2002, China 
attracted US$52.743 billion of FDI and became the number one in the world. The ratio 
of FDI to GDP was as high as approximately 4 per cent in 2001. Meanwhile, a large 
amount of foreign loans has been utilized in various areas of development.4 Also, China 
has seen an impressive growth of capital outflows in recent years, owing to the rapid 
growth of domestic enterprises. China’s investment abroad nearly tripled from 
US$2562.49 million in 1997 to US$6885.398 million in 2001. 
2.2  Further opening up after WTO accession 
Since becoming a member of the WTO, China has taken several steps to promote trade. 
On 1 January 2002, China cut import tariffs for more than 5000 goods. The average 
tariff rate was reduced to 12 per cent from a level of 15.3 per cent in 2001. The rate for 
manufacturing goods was reduced from 14.7 per cent to 11.3 per cent, while that for 
agricultural goods, except aquatic products, from 18.8 per cent to 15.8 per cent. At the 
same time, China abolished quota and license arrangement for grains, wool, cotton, 
                                                 
2 Unless indicated otherwise, data quoted in this section are all from the National Bureau of Statistics. 
3 See Table 3 in Démurger et al. (2002) for the timeline of policy initiatives. 
4 Stock market represents another avenue for attracting foreign capital.   4
chemical fertilizers, and so on. In addition, China modified or abolished those laws and 
regulations that are inconsistent with WTO rules. New laws on anti-dumping and anti-
subsidy have been implemented since 1 January 2002. Looking into the future, the 
average tariff rate will be cut from 12 per cent in 2002 to 9.3 per cent in 2005. Non-
tariff barriers will be removed for most manufacturing goods by the end of 2004. Small-
and medium-sized enterprises and foreign invested companies will be entitled to 
participate directly in international trade. 
Around China’s entry into the WTO, China issued new laws and regulations concerning 
service trade, covering legal service, telecommunication, financial institution, insurance, 
audio and video products, and tourism, etc. Laws regarding entry of foreign sales 
companies and joint ventures of stock exchange are being drawn up. Also, measures 
have been taken to ensure compliance with rules of the WTO on intellectual property, 
foreign investment, and information transmission.  
2.3  Globalization and regional inequality 
Clearly, China as a whole has gone a long way in globalization. However, there exist 
significant differences in the pace and extent of globalization across regions. This is 
particularly true when China is divided into three areas: the east, central and west. 
Figures 1 and 2 display the average FDI and trade/GDP ratio for each region (selected 
years). It is clear that east China attracts much more FDI and trade than the central and 
the west. And the inter-area gaps grew over time although convergences appear to have 
taken place, particularly within each area. Therefore, disparity in globalization is largely 
an inter-area issue. This finding also applies to other variables such as income, capital 
and degree of privatization. Therefore, it is justified to include area dummies in the 
income generating functions. 
Such differences in globalization may arise through a number of mechanisms and are 
expected to play a significant role in raising regional inequality. First, some regions 
have location advantages thus can better exploit benefits of trade (close to ports, Hong 
Kong, Macau, Russia, and Vietnam). Second, some regions possess more family ties to 
overseas investors thus would attract more FDI and associated spill-over effects. Third, 
some regions are endowed with more or better resources (infrastructure, human capital, 
market potential) thus can better attract FDI and develop trade. Finally, local culture, 
customs and traditions differ from region to region. These differences are embedded in 
the leadership styles of the regional and local governments thus make regional 
economies more or less receptive to foreign capitals and technologies. All the above 
differences lead to different paces of globalization in different regions, despite the 
uniform national policy of opening up and the appeals of the central government for 
local governments to actively embrace globalization. 
Needless to say, globalization comes with both benefits and costs, which are not evenly 
distributed among regions or individuals. Thus, it is imperative to analyze the impact of 
globalization on income inequality before policy measures can be designed and 
implemented to curb the fast rising regional income inequality in China. 
3  Accounting for China’s inter-regional income disparity 
To assess the relationship between inequality and globalization, the first step is to 
estimate an income generating function and then apply inequality operators on both    5






































































1997  2001 
Notes:   Eastern: 1 = Beijing, 2 = Tianjin, 3 = Hebei, 6 = Liaoning, 9 = Shanghai, 10 = Jiangsu, 11 = Zhejiang, 13 = Fujian, 19 = Guangdong, 21 = Hainan; 
Central: 4 = Shanxi, 5 = Inner Mongolia, 7 = Jilin, 8 = Heilongjiang, 12 = Anhui, 14 = Jiangxi, 15 = Shandong, 16 = Henan, 17 = Hubei, 18 = Hunan; 20 = Guangxi; 
Western: 23 = Sichuan, 24 = Guizhou, 25 = Yunnan, 27 = Shaanxi, 28 = Gansu, 29 = Qinghai, 30 = Ningxia; 31 = Xinjiang.   6


































































1997  2001 
Notes:   Eastern: 1 = Beijing, 2 = Tianjin, 3 = Hebei, 6 = Liaoning, 9 = Shanghai, 10 = Jiangsu, 11 = Zhejiang, 13 = Fujian, 19 = Guangdong, 21 = Hainan; 
Central: 4 = Shanxi, 5 = Inner Mongolia, 7 = Jilin, 8 = Heilongjiang, 12 = Anhui, 14 = Jiangxi, 15 = Shandong, 16 = Henan, 17 = Hubei, 18 = Hunan; 20 = Guangxi; 
Western: 23 = Sichuan, 24 = Guizhou, 25 = Yunnan, 27 = Shaanxi, 28 = Gansu, 29 = Qinghai, 30 = Ningxia; 31 = Xinjiang.   7
sides of the equation (see later discussions). In specifying the function, it is necessary to 
control for other factors. Many argue that policy biases are important in enlarging 
interregional income gap, including those in investment (Yang 1994), taxation and 
fiscal support (Raiser 1998; Ma and Yu 2003) and deregulation (Démurger et al. 2002). 
Investment will be represented by the per capita capital variable, fiscal support by fiscal 
expenditure for economic development, and deregulation by privatization index defined 
as proportion of non-SOE employees in total labour force. On the other hand, 
geography is important in affecting economic development. Thus dummy variables for 
east, central and west China will be included to control for geography and infrastructure 
(Démurger  2001). Further, urbanization differs from region to region and such 
differences affect regional per capita income and thus inequality. This can be controlled 
by an urbanization index, defined as the proportion of non-agricultural population. 
Finally, the conventional variables of capital, labour and education must be considered. 
Given labour surplus in China and the linear relationship between the variables of 
labour and dependency ratio, we chose to include the latter. The converging trend in the 
dependency ratio implies a declining contribution of this variable to inequality. 
The necessary regional or provincial data for 1987-2001 are compiled from 
Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials for 50 Years of New China, as well as 
various issues of China Statistics Yearbook, both published by the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS). With Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao excluded, there are 31 provinces 
or regions in China with comparable data, including four autonomous municipal cities. 
Chongqin – the youngest region in China – was created in 1997 and is merged with 
Sichuan. Tibet is not included due to lack of complete data. Therefore, a total of 29 
regions will be considered in this study. 
The observations on capital stock are taken from Zhang, Wu and Zhang (2004, ZWZ 
hereafter). ZWZ do not include inventory as capital stock while Zhang and Zhang 
(2003, ZZ hereafter) do although both studies use the same data estimation technique. 
Also, ZWZ construct the time series of capital stock as from 1952 rather than 1978 as in 
ZZ. Since inventory represents only potential not effective production input and biases 
in the estimate decrease as time interval expands between the initial year and the current 
year, data from ZWZ will be used in this paper. See the Appendix and ZWZ for more 
details. 
In short, the following variables are included in the underlying income generating 
function: per capita income (Y), per capita capital input (K), dependency ratio as an 
alternative of labour (Dep)5, average years of schooling (Edu), per capita FDI (FDI), 
trade-GDP ratio (Trade), reform or privatization defined as proportion of labour force 
working in the non-state-owned entities (Reform), urbanization defined as the 
proportion of non-agricultural population (Urb) that also serves as a proxy for 
industrialization, location dummies (Central and West),6 and dummies for the period 
1992 onwards (D92) and 1996 onwards (D96). The first is used to capture the effects of 
Deng Xiaoping’s South-China tour and the second to capture a number of significant 
                                                 
5 We tried to add per capita labour or household size, but neither of them is significant. 
6 Consistent with most studies, central provinces refer to Shanxi, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan, and western provinces include Sichuan, 
Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang.   8
reforms initiated in 1996, especially the labour market reform by separating redundent 
workers in public enterprises through reemployment centers. 
To minimize misspecification errors, we adopt the combined Box-Cox and Box-Tidwell 
model: 
Y
(λ) = a0 + a1X1
(θ) + a2X2
(θ) + …+ aKXK
(θ) + dummies + u,        (1) 
where λ and θ  are transformation parameters and other notations are self-explanatory. 
In this specification, 
λ
λ
λ 1 ) ( −
=
Y
Y  and 
θ
θ





X . As λ approaches 0, the limit of 
λ
λ 1 − Y
is Ln Y by L’Hopital’s rule. Hence, 
) (λ Y = Ln Y when λ = 0 (Judge et al., 1988). 
The same arguments apply to
) (θ
k X . Model (1) encompasses many functional forms, 
including the semilog income-generating function of Fields and Yoo (2000) if λ = 0 and 
θ = 1, and the standard linear function of Morduch and Sicular (2002) if λ = θ  = 1. In 
the case that λ = θ  = 0, a double-log equation, as used by Zhang and Zhang (2003) is 
obtained. When λ = -1 or θ = -1, the relevant variable becomes its reciprocal. Clearly, 
one can restrict each of the two transformation parameters to be 0, 1, -1 or unrestricted. 
The 4 by 4 combinations produce 16 different functional forms. Moreover, one can 
impose λ = θ although they are not restricted to a particular numerical value. Thus, at 
least 17 different models can be derived based on (1). 
These 17 models are fitted to the Chinese data. Model selection can be easily 
undertaken using the conventional χ
2 test where the test statistic is twice the difference 
in the loglikelihood values of model (1) and its restricted versions. As reported in Table 
A1 of the Appendix, the test results indicate rejections of all models with two 
exceptions. The first case involves imposing λ = 0 while θ  remaining being a free 
parameter. This amounts to a semilog model. The second case involves restricting λ = θ. 
Statistically speaking, these two models are equivalent to (1) and either of them can be 
used for inequality decomposition. We choose to use the semilog model largely because 
it is consistent with the human capital theory where almost all empirical studies apply 
logarithm transformation to the dependent variable in modeling the income generating 
process.  
Table 1 reports estimation results for the semilog model. No t-ratio is reported for the θ 
coefficient as it is obtained by grid search. Earlier rejection of the double-log model 
implies that θ is significantly different from zero. It is clear that the model fits the data 
quite well as indicated by the high R
2. All parameters are different from 0 at the 1 per 
cent or 5 per cent level of significance. Further, the signs of all parameter estimates are 
consistent with expectations. In particular, the coefficient estimates for the location 
dummies match the fact that western regions are poorer than central regions, which, in 
turn, are poorer than eastern regions. In terms of elasticity estimates, income growth is 
quite responsive to reform, education, government support, urbanization and domestic 
capital. The low elasticity of FDI is acceptable given its small sample mean value (517 
yuan) relative to domestic capital (4403 yuan). Since per capita domestic capital is 8.5 
times that of per capita FDI, the marginal impact of FDI on income is 45 per cent larger 
than that of domestic capital, which corroborates well with conventional wisdoms.   9
Table 1 
Estimated income generating functions 
Variable 
Coefficient 






Capital 0.034  4.615  0.000  0.105     
Dependency -0.064  -4.296 0.000 -0.118     
Education 0.150  2.536  0.012  0.193     
Expenditure 0.054  4.976  0.000  0.110     
FDI 0.008  2.407  0.017  0.018    
Trade 0.038  4.349  0.000  0.058    
Reform 0.123  9.024  0.000  0.188  -2533.25  0.936 
Urbanization 0.083  4.946  0.000 0.129     
Central   -0.072  -3.295  0.001  -0.025     
West -0.168  -6.999  0.000  -0.046    
Year 92  0.083  4.818  0.000  0.056     
Year 96  0.170  9.524  0.000  0.068     
Constant   4.797  32.970  0.000  4.797     
θ  0.133          
 
To analyze inequality of income rather than inequality of logarithm of income, it is 




(θ) + …+ âKXK
(θ))·exp(dummies) exp (û)     (2) 
The term exp(â0) becomes a scalar in (2) and can be removed from the equation without 
any consequence when relative measures of inequality are used as in this paper. By the 
same token, year dummy terms can be removed since inequality will be measured and 
decomposed on a year-by-year basis. 
To decompose total inequality in Y using (2), the first step is to identify the contribution 
of the residual term û. This can be achieved by adopting the before-after principle of 
Cancian and Reed (1998). In other words, it can be calculated as the difference between 
inequality of the original income Y and that of income given by (2) when assuming 
û = 0. Denote this income by Ỹ and an inequality index by I, the residual contribution is 
simply equal to I(Y) – I(Ỹ), where: 
Ỹ =exp(â0) exp(â1X1
(θ)+â2X2
(θ) + …+ âKXK
(θ))·exp(dummies)       (3)   10
Again, the year dummy terms and exp(â0) can be removed from (3) without affecting 
the analytical results. In passing, it is noted that Ỹ differs from the usual predicted Y of a 
semilog econometric model by a factor of exp(0.5
∧2 σ ), where 
∧2 σ is the estimated 
variance of the error term (see Wan 1996). 
Using the Gini index as an example measure, total income inequality and the residual 
contribution for China are tabulated in Table 2 (for results using other measures, see 
Tables A2-A6 in the Appendix). The total inequality displays a clear upward trend, 
increased over 24 per cent from 1987 to 2001. This increase is also evident when other 
inequality indices are used. The values of Gini may appear smaller than some would 
expect. This is because they represent the between component – inequality between 
regions only, excluding the within component. To calculate the latter requires data at the 
individual or household level. 
 
Table 2 
Total inequality and explained proportion 





variables  Residual  = 100× (1-|Residual|/Total) 
1987 0.172 0.159  0.013  92.4 
1988 0.176 0.163  0.012  93.2 
1989 0.183 0.167  0.016  91.3 
1990 0.174 0.173  0.001  99.4 
1991 0.182 0.172  0.011  94.0 
1992 0.187 0.172  0.014  92.5 
1993 0.201 0.178  0.022  89.1 
1994 0.206 0.187  0.019  90.8 
1995 0.210 0.198  0.012  94.3 
1996 0.206 0.202  0.004  98.1 
1997 0.203 0.206  -0.003  98.5 
1998 0.199 0.204  -0.004  98.0 
1999 0.206 0.209  -0.003  98.5 
2000 0.208 0.211  -0.003  98.6 
2001 0.214 0.210  0.003  98.6 
 
* Ideally, the residual should make nil contribution so that exactly 100 per cent of total 
inequality is explained. A negative (positive) residual contribution implies that variables not 
considered are (dis-)equalizing forces. In both cases, total equality is not perfectly 
explained by the deterministic part of the model. Thus, the ratio of the absolute value of 
residual contribution to the total inequality indicates the proportion of inequality not 
explained and 1 minus this proportion can be defined as the explained proportion.   11
The difference between the total inequality and the residual contribution equals the 
contributions of those independent variables included in the income generating function. 
Therefore, the residual contribution can be interpreted as that part of inequality not 
accounted for by the included variables. In other words, the residual contribution 
represents the effect on inequality of excluded variables. In an ideal situation, the 
residual should make nil contribution so that exactly 100 per cent of total inequality is 
explained. This usually requires a perfect fit of the income generating function. 
Generally speaking, it is a rule rather than exception that the residual contribution is 
non-zero. Both negative and positive residual contributions indicate lack of explanatory 
power of the estimated function with respect to total inequality. A positive (negative) 
contribution implies that the effects of excluded variables are more beneficial to the rich 
(poor). It is thus reasonable to use the ratio of the absolute value of the residual 
contribution over total inequality to indicate the proportion of inequality not explained. 
It follows that one minus this proportion can be defined as the explained proportion, 
which reflects the quality of the modeling work. When the model fits the data poorly, 
this proportion would be low and the corresponding research findings would be of little 
value as policy initiatives based on these findings would be ineffective.7 From this 
perspective, our modeling exercise is quite successful as we can explain up to 99.4 per 
cent of total inequality (last column of Table 2). Even in the worst case of 1993, almost 
90 per cent of total inequality is explained. 
Attention is now turned to contributions of individual variables, which can be obtained 
using the Shapley value procedure of Shorrocks (1999).8 The full decomposition results 
are presented in the Appendix as Tables A2-A6, with inequality measured respectively 
by the Gini coefficient, the generalized entropy measures (GE0 and GE1), the Atkinson 
index, and the squared coefficient of variation (CV). As expected, the decomposition 
results differ depending on the indicator of inequality used. This is not surprising 
because different indicators are associated with different social welfare functions and 
presume different aversions to inequality. They also place different weights to different 
segments of the underlying Lorenz curve. It is noted, however, that the squared CV 
violates the principle of transfer and the Atkinson index is ordinally equivalent to the 
GE measures as its entire family can be expressed as a monotonic transformation of the 
latter (Shorrocks and Slottje 2002). Consequently, we only use results under the Gini, 
the Theil Index (GE1) and the mean logarithmic deviation (GE0) in the following 
discussions. 
Although pointing to a similar increasing trend in total inequality, different indicators 
rank variables differently (Table 3). Nevertheless, they are largely consistent in ranking 
the less important contributors. For example, all three indices show that dependency rate 
is the least important variable and they are broadly consistent in ranking FDI and 
education as the second and third least important factors. Further, some agreement is 
seen with respect to capital and urbanization as the most important factors. In the early 
years, consistent ranking is evident for reform and trade, even government support. In 
                                                 
7 It can be shown that when R
2 = 1 or 0, the explained proportion is 1 or 0. When CV
2 is used as the 
measure of inequality, the explained proportion is always identical to the R
2. 
8 For this purpose, a Java programme is developed by the World Institute for Development Economics 
Research of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER). This programme allows decomposition of 
inequality of a dependent variable into components associated with any number of independent variables 
and under any functional form.   12
later years, differences in the ranking emerge regarding contributions of important 
variables such as location and government fiscal support for economic development. 
Table 3 
Rank of relative contribution by alternative inequality measures 
Year K  Dep Edu Gov  FDI  Trade Reform  Urb  Location 
1987 3  9  7,7,6  4  8 5 6,6,7  1  2 
1988 3  9  7,7,6  4  8 5 6,6,7 2,1,1 1,2,2 
1989 3,3,2  9  7,7,6  4  8  5 6,6,7 2,1,1 1,2,3 
1990 3,3,2  9  7,7,6  5,5,4  8 4,4,5 6,6,7  2,1,1  1,2,3 
1991 3,3,2  9  7  5,5,4  8 4,4,5 6  2,1,1 1,2,3 
1992 3,1,1  9  7,8,8  5,4,4 8,7,7 4,5,5 6  2,3,2 1,2,3 
1993 2,1,1  9  7  6,4,4  8  5 4,6,6 3,3,2 1,2,3 
1994 2,1,1  9  8  5,4,4  7 6,6,5 4,5,6  3  1,2,2 
1995 1  9  8  4,3,2 7 6 3,5,5 5,4,4 2,2,3 
1996 1  9  8  4,3,2 7 6 3,5,5 5,4,4 2,2,3 
1997 1  9  8  3,2,2 7 6 4,4,5 5,5,4 2,3,3 
1998 1  9  8  3,2,2 7  6,5,5 4,6,6  5,4,4  2,3,3 
1999 1  9  8  5,2,2 7  4,3,3  3,5,5  6  2,4,4 
2000 1  9  8  4,2,2 7  5,3,3  2,4,4  6  3,5,5 
2001 1  9  8  5,3,2 7  4,2,3  3,4,4  6  2,5,5 
 
Note: One number indicates consistent ranking. Three numbers indicate ranks by Gini, GE0 and 
GE1, respectively. 
Faced with the inconsistency, one either chooses a particular measure or takes the 
average across different indicators (only applicable to the relative contributions) and 
proceeds to interpretation and discussions. Table 4 presents relative contributions 
associated with each causing variable, averaged across the three measures. The 
contributions are calculated using the total explained portion as the denominator thus 
they sum to 100 per cent. The right panel of Table 4 contains ranking of variables based 
on the average contributions. Not surprisingly, the least important variable is still the 
dependency rate. This is attributable to the converging trend in this variable, partly 
driven by the nation-wide policy of birth control. The result also reflects the fact of 
surplus labour in China, thus differences in dependency rate across regions is of little 
significance in income generation. It must be noted that this is only true at the highly 
aggregate level. Labour input and dependency rate are still important at the household 
level in terms of income generation. 
It is clear that physical capital has always been important. Its importance increased over 
time and it now constitutes almost 20 per cent of total inequality, making it the largest   13
contributor. On the other hand, urbanization was the number one factor but its role 
quickly declined. It ranked the first in the 1980s, dropped to the third or fourth position 
and finally settled at the sixth position. This reflects well the converging trend in 
urbanization across China. Despite so, urbanization still contributes almost 12 per cent 
to total inequality. Sharing a similar trend with urbanization, location has become much 
less important with its ranking dropped from the second (even first in 1992) to third and 
finally fifth. The declining contribution does not necessarily mean narrowing gaps in 
factors associated with location (natural resources, weather, proximity to markets and 
ports). It means that other factors become more unequally distributed across China. 
Meanwhile, advances in transport and communication technologies are bound to help 
moderate the effects of location on growth. 
It is clear that FDI ranks the second or third least important determinant of regional 
inequality in China till the early 1990s. However, it has gained importance in recent 
years. Trade also gained importance over time although its individual influence has 
been moderate. If one combines trade and FDI as an overall indicator of globalization, 
the contribution is quite substantial, particularly in the later years. The combined 
contribution was around 17 per cent earlier but now over 22 per cent, surpassing the 
capital variable. It is important to note that this finding is robust to inequality measures. 
Therefore, globalization does deserve serious consideration owing to its large and 
increasing effects on regional inequality, which has implications for poverty and 
poverty reduction in China. The increasing contribution of globalization is a result of 
increased trade and FDI inflow. 
Over time, a number of factors gained prominence. Reform or privatization was in sixth 
position but moved up to third position, highlighting the unequal pace in privatizing 
state-owned entities and the importance of privatization on income growth. It is 
interesting to observe that government support for economic development is diverging. 
The positive contribution implies less (more) developed areas provide less (more) 
support. The diverging trend may have to do with the taxation reform initiated in 1994 
which significantly enhances the budgeting and spending power of local governments 
thus allows rich regions to collect more taxes and fees to finance economic activities. 
This finding is in line with Wan, Huang and Wang (forthcoming) and Raiser (1998) that 
government transfer is inequality-increasing. 
The small and stable contribution of education is likely due to the many years of public 
provision of basic education in China, particularly in the urban areas. A surprising result 
is that the contribution of education only ranks the second or third from the last, a 
finding not inconsistent with ZZ. However, the impacts of reform and urbanization on 
inequality are expected to decline in the long run because slow reformers or late comers 
are bound to catch up. After all, these two variables have a maximum value of 100. The 
role of location will diminish as technology development in transportation and 
communications are helping to downplay the importance of physical isolation or 
distance. This diminishing role is reinforced by the historical campaign of western 
development characterized with huge amounts of infrastructure investment in the 
location-disadvantageous regions. As known, the effects of infrastructural investment 
on development are typically lagged.   14
Table 4 
Averaged relative contribution 
  Relative contribution (%)    Rank 




K  Dep Edu Gov FDI  Trade Reform Urb Location 
1987 14.62 4.38  6.88 14.12 4.75 11.67 8.22  18.58 16.78  16.42    3 9 7 4 8 5  6  1  2 
1988 15.23 4.15  6.76 13.75 5.40 12.14 7.83  17.95 16.79  17.54    3 9 7 4 8 5  6  1  2 
1989 15.75 3.70  6.66 13.27 5.81 12.36 8.09  17.60 16.76  18.17    3 9 7 5 8 4  6  1  2 
1990 15.96 3.48  7.66 12.54 5.91 12.58 8.41  16.97 16.48  18.49    3 9 7 5 8 4  6  1  2 
1991 16.35 3.40  6.48 12.44 6.32 12.53 8.82  16.86 16.80  18.85    3 9 7 5 8 4  6  1  2 
1992 16.77 3.60  6.45 12.01 6.58 12.03 9.30  16.36 16.90  18.61    2 9 8 5 7 4  6  3  1 
1993 16.80 3.58  7.04 11.71 6.49 11.67 10.72 15.61 16.38  18.17    1 9 7 4 8 5  6  3  2 
1994 16.88 3.75  5.81 13.32 6.81 11.47 11.88 14.19 15.90  18.28    1 9 8 4 7 6  5  3  2 
1995 17.40 3.47  5.86 14.38 6.85 10.90 12.71 13.39 15.05  17.76    1 9 8 3 7 6  5  4  2 
1996 17.93 3.24  5.47 14.50 6.83 11.26 12.82 13.01 14.93  18.10    1 9 8 3 7 6  5  4  2 
1997 18.05 2.97  5.32 15.21 6.94 11.59 12.77 12.45 14.69  18.54    1 9 8 2 7 6  4  5  3 
1998 18.74 2.73  5.24 15.41 7.21 11.80 11.47 12.56 14.84  19.00    1 9 8 2 7 5  6  4  3 
1999 18.82 0.54  5.23 14.62 7.08 13.98 13.38 12.19 14.17  21.06    1 9 8 2 7 4  5  6  3 
2000 18.60 0.05  4.49 15.13 7.02 14.41 14.51 11.70 14.09  21.43    1 9 8 2 7 4  3  6  5 
2001 19.11 0.52  4.81 14.07 7.14 14.52 14.26 11.58 13.99  21.66    1 9 8 4 7 2  3  6  5 
   15
It is worth noting that a declining relative contribution does not necessarily mean a 
decreasing absolute contribution. A careful examination of Tables A2-A6 reveals that 
apart from the dependency rate and urbanization, all other variables contribute more and 
more to total inequality. Dependency rate is the only variable with declining 
contribution in both relative and absolute terms. Urbanization more or less maintained 
its absolute contribution but displayed a declining relative contribution because of the 
increasing trend in the total inequality.  
It is tempting to discuss our findings in relation to ZZ. However, this is not appropriate 
for a number of reasons. First, we focus on income inequality while ZZ on partial labour 
productivity. Second, ZZ employ a double log model which is rejected in this paper. 
Third, ZZ relies on the logarithmic variance as the only measure of inequality. Our 
results are robust to inequality measures and based on a flexible modeling strategy. An 
indication of inadequacy of ZZ lies in that domestic capital is more productive than 
FDI, which is difficult to accept. 
4 Concluding  remarks 
This paper provides an accounting for China’s regional income inequality, with a 
special emphasis on the impact of globalization. Using a carefully constructed panel 
data set, a Box-Cox modeling strategy is adopted to minimize specification errors. A 
semilog income generating function is selected from among many alternative models. 
The empirical model is estimated quite successfully and the decomposition results are 
reasonable. It is found that (a) globalization constitutes a positive and substantial share 
to regional inequality and the share rises over time; (b) capital is one of the largest and 
increasingly important contributor to regional inequality; (c) economic reform 
characterized by privatization exerts a significant impact on regional inequality; and 
(d) the relative contributions of education, location, urbanization and dependency ratio 
to regional inequality have been declining. 
The policy implications are quite straightforward. Further globalization will lead to 
higher regional inequality in China unless concerted efforts are devoted to promote 
trade in and FDI flows to the west and central China. Policy biases which prompted 
trade and FDI but gradually phasing out in coastal China should be implemented in 
other parts. Market size and market potential place the poor regions in a 
disadvantageous position in attracting FDI but a converging trend in FDI and trade is 
encouraging. More important is the domestic capital; equalization of which will cut 
regional inequality by 20 per cent. This calls for development of capital market in 
China, especially in poor rural areas. To narrow down the gap in capital possession, it is 
necessary though difficult to break the vicious circle existing in capital formation. 
Again, policy concessions for investment in the poor regions are needed in terms of 
taxation and bank lending. In particular, continued financial reforms are useful in 
eliminating discrimination in lending for SOEs and non-farming activities. Finally, there 
is a case for dramatic turns in the fiscal policy which so far had favoured the developed 
regions. An equalization in fiscal support would cause an almost 15 per cent drop in 
regional inequality and a reverse in fiscal support would lead to a much larger impact. 
In all, these three variables contribute over half of the total regional inequality.   16
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Data Appendix 
(1) The data during 1987-1998, if not otherwise indicated, are all from Comprehensive 
Statistical Data and Materials for 50 Years of New China (Beijing: China Statistical 
Publishing House, 1999). The data during 1999-2001, unless otherwise indicated, are 
from  China Statistical Yearbook, 2000, 2001 and 2002 (Beijing: China Statistical 
Publishing House, 1999, 2001 and 2002). 
(2)  Income: The provincial income is the urban-rural average per capita income 
weighted by non-agricultural and agricultural population. The data of urban and rural 
per capita income has been deflated by urban and rural CPIs in various provinces in 
various years. In the three largest provincial-level cities, urban and rural CPIs are the 
same.  
(3) Capital: Per capita capital is computed from the provincial capital stock estimation 
in 1952 price by perpetual stock method in Zhang et al. (2004). The paper provides 
capital data during 1952-2000, and the authors helped extend it to 2001. Compared with 
the capital data used in ZZ, the data we use excludes inventory and gets a lower 
estimation of capital stock. Further more, the data we use starts from 1952, and with a 
long time series, the effects of errors in estimation in early years have been minimized. 
To get a capital stock in 1952, Zhang et al. (2004) used a widely used method to 









where K0 is the capital stock in the starting year, I0 the investment in the same year, 
δ the depreciation rate, and r the average growth rate of real investment before the 
starting year. This method is used in Hall and Jones (1999), Young (2000) and also ZZ. 
Zhang et al. (2004) has used a similar denominator in the formula in Young (2000) to 
estimate the capital stock in 1952. Please refer to Zhang et al. (2004) for more details of 
the estimation. 








(5)  Education ( edu):  China  Population Yearbooks have  reports of the population 
structure by education since 1987. Unfortunately, data were not published in 1989, 
1991 and 1992. Data in 1987 and 1988 did not report illiteracy numbers. And data 
in 1994 did not include population below 15-year old, thus not comparable with data in 
other years. In this study, we use the available data to predict the missing values 
in above-mentioned years via an equation with regional fixed effects and time trend 
controlled for. The estimation method is GLS for panel data with heteroskedasticity 
among panels. The dependent variables are taken log in case of any negative predicted 
value. So the equation is written as: 
µ + ⋅ = ) ( ) ln( f edu    20
where ln(edu) is the logarithm of the per capita years of schooling, f(·) the linear 
combination of the regional dummies and time trend, µ  the error term. The value of R
2 
of the equation for per capita years of schooling is 0.966. According to the equation, 
and denote the predicted value by ^, we have: 
] ) ln( exp[
^ ^
edu edu =  
where 
^
) ln(edu  denotes the predicted values of ln(edu) from the estimation for the 
missing years. 
(6) FDI: FDI is defined as per capita FDI. The data of FDI in Sichuan during 1987–
1989 are from China Statistical Yearbook of corresponding years. The data of FDI in 
Qinghai in 1988 and 2000 are the average of the neighbouring two years. The data of 
FDI has been transformed into RMB using the medium exchange rate in corresponding 
years that are from China Statistical Yearbook of corresponding years.  
(7) Trade: Trade is computed as the trade/GDP ratio. The data of international trade has 
been transformed into RMB before divided by GDP.  
(8) Reform: Reform is computed as the proportion of workers and staff in non-state-
owned units. 
(9)  Urbanization: Urbanization is defined as the proportion of non-agricultural 
population in the total. Except for Hebei, Heilongjiang and Gansu, data of agricultural 
and non-agricultural population during 1999-2001 are from provincial statistical 
yearbooks. Population data of Hebei, Heilongjiang and Gansu in 2000 are from China 
Statistical Yearbook, 2001, the data in 1999 are the average of the neighbouring two 
years, and the data in 2001 are forecast based on the data in 2000 and the growth rate 
during 1999-2000. 
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Table A1 
Results of χ
2 Test with H0: Model 1 = Each of Models 2-17 
Restriction Loglikelihood    Test  Model 
λ  θ  value  χ
2-value result* 
1 unrestricted  unrestricted -2531.95     
2 1 1  -2597.99  132.12  Reject  H0 
3 0 1  -2549.76  35.66  Reject  H0 
4 -1 1 -2626.95  190.04  Reject  H0 
5 unrestricted 1  -2548.57  33.28  Reject  H0 
6 1 0  -2736.63  409.4  Reject  H0 
7 0 0  -2538.46  13.06  Reject  H0 
8 -1 0 -2639.75  215.64  Reject  H0 
9 unrestricted 0  -2538.01  12.16  Reject  H0 
10 1  -1  -2881.68  699.5  Reject  H0 
11 0  -1  -2623.76  183.66  Reject  H0 
12 -1  -1 -2616.76  169.66  Reject  H0 
13 unrestricted  -1  -2585.45  107.04  Reject  H0 
14 1  unrestricted -2590.63  117.4  Reject  H0 
15 0  unrestricted -2533.25  2.64  Accept H0 
16 -1  unrestricted -2626.9  189.94  Reject  H0 
17  λ = θ  -2532.74 1.62  Accept H0 
 
Note: *level of significance = 1 per cent. 
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Table A2 
Inequality decomposition results, Gini index 
Relative contribution (%)  Absolute contribution  
Year K  Dep Edu Gov FDI  Trade Reform Urb  Location   K  Dep Edu Gov FDI  Trade Reform Urb  Location 
1987 13.49 3.85  6.56 13.35 4.45 11.66 11.03 17.92 17.69   0.021 0.006 0.010 0.021 0.007 0.019 0.018 0.029  0.028 
1988 14.16 3.73  6.47 13.06 5.08 12.11 10.38 17.36 17.63   0.023 0.006 0.011 0.021 0.008 0.020 0.017 0.028  0.029 
1989 14.67 3.34  6.38 12.59 5.49 12.42 10.43 17.05 17.62   0.024 0.006 0.011 0.021 0.009 0.021 0.017 0.028  0.029 
1990 14.92 3.16  7.40 11.97 5.60 12.70 10.45 16.46 17.34   0.026 0.005 0.013 0.021 0.010 0.022 0.018 0.028  0.030 
1991 15.39 3.10  6.24 11.91 6.04 12.67 10.64 16.40 17.61   0.026 0.005 0.011 0.020 0.010 0.022 0.018 0.028  0.030 
1992 15.90 3.29  6.25 11.44 6.32 12.19 10.91 15.97 17.74   0.027 0.006 0.011 0.020 0.011 0.021 0.019 0.027  0.031 
1993 16.04 3.23  6.96 11.29 6.30 11.81 11.87 15.26 17.23   0.029 0.006 0.012 0.020 0.011 0.021 0.021 0.027  0.031 
1994 16.19 3.37  5.74 12.57 6.66 11.51 13.07 13.92 16.98   0.030 0.006 0.011 0.024 0.012 0.022 0.024 0.026  0.032 
1995 16.72 3.05  5.80 13.51 6.75 10.96 13.85 13.12 16.23   0.033 0.006 0.011 0.027 0.013 0.022 0.027 0.026  0.032 
1996 17.18 2.93  5.39 13.59 6.71 11.33 13.98 12.75 16.13   0.035 0.006 0.011 0.027 0.014 0.023 0.028 0.026  0.033 
1997 17.30 2.69  5.32 14.20 6.81 11.66 13.94 12.20 15.88   0.036 0.006 0.011 0.029 0.014 0.024 0.029 0.025  0.033 
1998 17.95 2.55  5.26 14.43 7.07 11.89 12.54 12.28 16.04   0.037 0.005 0.011 0.029 0.014 0.024 0.026 0.025  0.033 
1999 18.08 0.81  5.10 13.72 6.94 13.77 14.28 11.92 15.38   0.038 0.002 0.011 0.029 0.015 0.029 0.030 0.025  0.032 
2000 17.82 0.49  4.38 14.37 6.85 14.17 15.27 11.44 15.20   0.038 0.001 0.009 0.030 0.014 0.030 0.032 0.024  0.032 
2001 18.37 0.90  4.77 13.32 6.98 14.34 14.77 11.44 15.12   0.039 0.002 0.010 0.028 0.015 0.030 0.031 0.024  0.032 
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Table A3 
Inequality decomposition results, GE index (a = 0) 
Relative contribution (%)  Absolute cContribution 
Year K  Dep Edu Gov FDI  Trade Reform Urb  Location   K  Dep Edu Gov FDI  Trade Reform Urb Location 
1987 14.94 4.38  7.05 14.27 4.80 11.73 7.35 18.82 16.65   0.006 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.008  0.007 
1988 15.53 4.14  6.91 13.85 5.47 12.20 7.06 18.15 16.69   0.007 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.008  0.007 
1989 16.06 3.67  6.79 13.36 5.88 12.40 7.39 17.79 16.66   0.007 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.008  0.007 
1990 16.24 3.42  7.79 12.60 6.01 12.62 7.82 17.12 16.37   0.008 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.008  0.008 
1991 16.59 3.35  6.58 12.50 6.41 12.57 8.31 16.98 16.70   0.008 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.008  0.008 
1992 16.99 3.55  6.53 12.09 6.66 12.07 8.86 16.46 16.79   0.008 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.008  0.008 
1993 16.99 3.51  7.10 11.73 6.56 11.71 10.42 15.68 16.29   0.009 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.008  0.008 
1994 17.06 3.71  5.85 13.45 6.87 11.52 11.60 14.21 15.73   0.010 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.008  0.009 
1995 17.58 3.43  5.88 14.56 6.90 10.94 12.45 13.41 14.85   0.011 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.008  0.009 
1996 18.13 3.17  5.49 14.69 6.90 11.30 12.56 13.01 14.75   0.012 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.008  0.010 
1997 18.24 2.90  5.32 15.42 7.02 11.63 12.50 12.44 14.52   0.012 0.002 0.004 0.010 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.008  0.010 
1998 18.94 2.62  5.27 15.61 7.29 11.83 11.19 12.57 14.68   0.012 0.002 0.003 0.010 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.008  0.010 
1999 19.04 0.33  5.26 14.80 7.16 14.11 13.15 12.20 13.96   0.013 0.000 0.004 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.008  0.010 
2000 18.81 -0.24 4.52 15.27 7.11 14.57 14.32 11.71 13.94   0.013 0.000 0.003 0.011 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.008  0.010 
2001 19.34 0.25  4.84 14.17 7.24 14.65 14.16 11.55 13.80   0.014 0.000 0.003 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.008  0.010 
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Table A4 
Inequality decomposition results, GE index (a = 1) 
Relative contribution (%)  Absolute contribution 
Year K  Dep Edu Gov FDI  Trade Reform Urb  Location   K  Dep Edu Gov FDI  Trade Reform Urb Location 
1987 15.42 4.91  7.04 14.74 4.99 11.62 6.28 19.01 16.00   0.007 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.008  0.007 
1988 16.01 4.57  6.90 14.33 5.64 12.11 6.05 18.34 16.06   0.007 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.008  0.007 
1989 16.52 4.10  6.80 13.85 6.05 12.26 6.45 17.96 16.01   0.008 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.009  0.008 
1990 16.73 3.87  7.78 13.06 6.13 12.42 6.95 17.33 15.73   0.008 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.009  0.008 
1991 17.06 3.76  6.62 12.91 6.52 12.34 7.51 17.19 16.09   0.008 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.009  0.008 
1992 17.42 3.96  6.56 12.51 6.75 11.84 8.13 16.66 16.17   0.009 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.008  0.008 
1993 17.36 4.00  7.05 12.10 6.62 11.50 9.86 15.88 15.62   0.009 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.009  0.008 
1994 17.39 4.16  5.85 13.93 6.90 11.38 10.97 14.44 14.98   0.010 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.009  0.009 
1995 17.89 3.92  5.89 15.06 6.91 10.81 11.82 13.64 14.06   0.012 0.003 0.004 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.009  0.010 
1996 18.47 3.61  5.54 15.22 6.89 11.16 11.92 13.26 13.92   0.013 0.003 0.004 0.011 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.009  0.010 
1997 18.61 3.32  5.31 16.01 7.00 11.49 11.87 12.71 13.67   0.014 0.002 0.004 0.012 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.009  0.010 
1998 19.33 3.02  5.20 16.20 7.26 11.67 10.68 12.84 13.80   0.014 0.002 0.004 0.012 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.009  0.010 
1999 19.35 0.48  5.33 15.34 7.13 14.06 12.71 12.45 13.16   0.015 0.000 0.004 0.012 0.005 0.011 0.010 0.009  0.010 
2000 19.16 -0.09 4.56 15.74 7.09 14.50 13.95 11.95 13.14   0.015 0.000 0.004 0.012 0.005 0.011 0.011 0.009  0.010 
2001 19.63 0.41  4.83 14.71 7.21 14.56 13.85 11.74 13.05   0.015 0.000 0.004 0.011 0.006 0.011 0.011 0.009  0.010 
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Table A5 
Inequality decomposition results, Atkinson index (e = 0) 
Relative contribution (%)  Absolute contribution 
Year K  Dep Edu Gov FDI  Trade Reform Urb  Location   K  Dep Edu Gov FDI  Trade Reform Urb Location 
1987 14.93 4.38  7.04 14.27 4.79 11.73 7.37 18.83 16.66   0.006 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.008  0.007 
1988 15.53 4.13  6.89 13.84 5.46 12.20 7.08 18.16 16.70   0.007 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.008  0.007 
1989 16.06 3.66  6.78 13.36 5.87 12.39 7.41 17.79 16.67   0.007 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.008  0.007 
1990 16.24 3.42  7.78 12.60 5.99 12.62 7.84 17.13 16.39   0.007 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.008  0.008 
1991 16.60 3.34  6.57 12.50 6.40 12.57 8.32 16.99 16.71   0.008 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.008  0.008 
1992 17.00 3.54  6.51 12.08 6.65 12.06 8.87 16.46 16.81   0.008 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.008  0.008 
1993 17.01 3.51  7.09 11.72 6.54 11.71 10.43 15.69 16.31   0.008 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.008  0.008 
1994 17.08 3.70  5.84 13.45 6.85 11.51 11.62 14.21 15.74   0.009 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.008  0.009 
1995 17.60 3.42  5.86 14.56 6.88 10.93 12.46 13.41 14.86   0.011 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.008  0.009 
1996 18.16 3.16  5.47 14.69 6.89 11.29 12.58 13.01 14.76   0.011 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.008  0.009 
1997 18.27 2.89  5.31 15.43 7.01 11.62 12.51 12.44 14.53   0.012 0.002 0.003 0.010 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.008  0.009 
1998 18.96 2.62  5.25 15.62 7.27 11.82 11.20 12.56 14.70   0.012 0.002 0.003 0.010 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.008  0.009 
1999 19.07 0.34  5.24 14.79 7.14 14.11 13.16 12.19 13.97   0.013 0.000 0.004 0.010 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.008  0.009 
2000 18.83 -0.23 4.50 15.27 7.09 14.56 14.33 11.70 13.95   0.013 0.000 0.003 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.008  0.009 
2001 19.37 0.25  4.82 14.17 7.22 14.65 14.17 11.54 13.81   0.013 0.000 0.003 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.008  0.009 
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Table A6 
Inequality decomposition results, CV 
Relative contribution (%)  Absolute contribution 
Year K  Dep Edu Gov FDI  Trade Reform Urb  Location   K  Dep Edu Gov FDI  Trade Reform Urb  Location 
1987 15.90 5.47  7.06 15.20 5.18 11.52 5.12 19.19 15.36   0.016 0.005 0.007 0.015 0.005 0.011 0.005 0.019  0.015 
1988 16.49 5.02  6.94 14.83 5.82 12.02 4.93 18.53 15.42   0.017 0.005 0.007 0.015 0.006 0.012 0.005 0.019  0.016 
1989 16.99 4.55  6.85 14.35 6.23 12.11 5.41 18.15 15.36   0.018 0.005 0.007 0.015 0.007 0.013 0.006 0.019  0.016 
1990 17.22 4.33  7.81 13.54 6.28 12.19 6.00 17.55 15.08   0.019 0.005 0.009 0.015 0.007 0.014 0.007 0.020  0.017 
1991 17.54 4.19  6.70 13.33 6.63 12.08 6.63 17.42 15.47   0.019 0.005 0.007 0.015 0.007 0.013 0.007 0.019  0.017 
1992 17.85 4.38  6.63 12.95 6.85 11.59 7.31 16.89 15.54   0.020 0.005 0.007 0.014 0.008 0.013 0.008 0.019  0.017 
1993 17.73 4.52  7.06 12.49 6.69 11.26 9.23 16.10 14.91   0.021 0.005 0.008 0.015 0.008 0.014 0.011 0.019  0.018 
1994 17.70 4.65  5.89 14.44 6.94 11.21 10.26 14.71 14.19   0.024 0.006 0.008 0.020 0.009 0.015 0.014 0.020  0.019 
1995 18.18 4.43  5.95 15.57 6.92 10.65 11.12 13.92 13.25   0.028 0.007 0.009 0.024 0.011 0.016 0.017 0.021  0.020 
1996 18.78 4.10  5.65 15.78 6.89 10.99 11.20 13.56 13.05   0.030 0.007 0.009 0.025 0.011 0.018 0.018 0.022  0.021 
1997 18.95 3.79  5.34 16.63 7.00 11.29 11.18 13.04 12.78   0.032 0.006 0.009 0.028 0.012 0.019 0.019 0.022  0.022 
1998 19.67 3.46  5.18 16.81 7.24 11.46 10.13 13.17 12.88   0.032 0.006 0.009 0.028 0.012 0.019 0.017 0.022  0.021 
1999 19.65 0.60  5.46 15.91 7.12 13.94 12.18 12.78 12.36   0.035 0.001 0.010 0.028 0.013 0.024 0.021 0.022  0.022 
2000 19.48 0.04  4.66 16.25 7.09 14.38 13.48 12.29 12.33   0.035 0.000 0.008 0.029 0.013 0.026 0.024 0.022  0.022 
2001 19.90 0.54  4.88 15.28 7.21 14.42 13.45 12.04 12.28   0.035 0.001 0.009 0.027 0.013 0.025 0.024 0.021  0.022 
 